Unit 4(下)· Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly
下册(本册):介于完全竞争和垄断之间的两种结构——垄断竞争(4.4)与寡头(4.5),以及分析寡头的工具:博弈论。
- 需求向下倾斜的企业:MR 在需求下方(同一纵截距、斜率加倍),多卖一个要降低所有单位的价格。
- 任何企业都在 MR = MC 处定产量,价格从需求曲线上读,利润 = (P − ATC) × Q。
- P > MC → 配置无效率,有无谓损失;不在 ATC 最低点生产 → 生产无效率。
- Unit 3 的进入与退出:有经济利润就有企业进入,有亏损就有企业退出,直到经济利润为 0——只要没有进入壁垒。
- 说出垄断竞争的特征,解释产品差异化与广告的作用 · Describe monopolistic competition, product differentiation, and advertising
- 画出垄断竞争企业的短期盈利、亏损图,以及长期均衡(需求与 ATC 相切) · Graph short-run profit/loss and long-run equilibrium
- 解释长期零利润、产能过剩与 P > MC,并与完全竞争、垄断比较 · Explain excess capacity and inefficiency
- 说出寡头的特征,解释合谋、卡特尔和作弊的动机 · Explain oligopoly, collusion, cartels, and the incentive to cheat
- 读收益矩阵,找出优势策略和纳什均衡,识别囚徒困境 · Find dominant strategies and Nash equilibria in a payoff matrix
- 收益改变后重画矩阵,计算改变优势策略所需的激励,算出合并后的最大总利润 · Redraw matrices and calculate the incentive needed to change a dominant strategy
| Term 术语 | Meaning 含义 | 中文 |
|---|---|---|
| Monopolistic Competition | Many firms, differentiated products, free entry and exit | 垄断竞争 |
| Product Differentiation | Making a product different from rivals' (style, location, quality, brand) | 产品差异化 |
| Nonprice Competition | Competing through advertising, design, service rather than price | 非价格竞争 |
| Excess Capacity | Output below the quantity that minimizes ATC | 产能过剩 |
| Oligopoly / Duopoly | A few interdependent firms; two firms | 寡头 / 双头垄断 |
| Interdependence | Each firm's profit depends on rivals' choices | 相互依存 |
| Collusion / Cartel | Firms coordinate to act like a monopoly; a formal collusive agreement | 合谋 / 卡特尔 |
| Game / Strategy / Payoff | Interaction among players; a complete plan of actions; the result for each player | 博弈 / 策略 / 收益 |
| Payoff Matrix (Normal Form) | Table showing the payoffs for each combination of strategies | 收益矩阵 |
| Dominant Strategy | A strategy that is best no matter what the other player does | 优势策略 |
| Nash Equilibrium | No player can gain by changing strategy alone, given the others' strategies | 纳什均衡 |
| Prisoner's Dilemma | Each player's dominant strategy leads to an outcome worse for both | 囚徒困境 |
4.4Monopolistic Competition 垄断竞争
大学城的一条街上有十几家炸鸡店:有的主打韩式甜辣,有的主打脆皮,有的离宿舍最近,有的能送外卖。每家都能自己定价,但如果比别人贵太多,顾客就去隔壁了;生意好的话,很快就会有新店开出来。这就是垄断竞争——名字里既有“垄断”(自己的产品独一份),也有“竞争”(很多相似的对手、进出自由)。
Characteristics 特征与产品差异化
- 企业很多:每家只占市场的一小部分,不会去盯着某个对手的反应(这一点和寡头不同)。
- 产品有差异(differentiated products):相似但不相同,所以每家面对向下倾斜的需求,有一点定价能力。
- 进入和退出自由(low barriers to entry):所以长期经济利润会被推到 0(这一点和垄断不同)。
- 常用广告和品牌来突出自己的不同——即非价格竞争(nonprice competition)。
- 垄断竞争企业的需求向下倾斜,是因为产品有差异,不是因为企业多、也不是因为进入容易。
- 它不是 price taker:MR < P。只有完全竞争企业才有 MR = P。
Advertising 广告与非价格竞争
完全竞争的农民不打广告,垄断竞争的企业却天天打。广告的目的有两个:让需求增加(更多人想买这一家),以及让需求更缺乏弹性(顾客更忠诚,涨一点价也不走)。
A hot-pot restaurant in a monopolistically competitive market is deciding how many promotional videos to buy on a short-video app. The table shows the total benefit (extra profit before paying for the ads) and the total cost of the videos.
| Number of videos | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Total benefit ($) | 1,500 | 2,700 | 3,600 | 4,200 | 4,500 | 4,600 |
| Total cost ($) | 400 | 900 | 1,500 | 2,200 | 3,000 | 3,900 |
(a) Calculate the total net benefit of buying 2 videos. (b) Calculate the marginal net benefit of the 3rd video. (c) What is the optimal number of videos? Explain using marginal analysis. (d) A holiday season raises the marginal benefit of every video by $200. What is the new optimal number? (e) Why does a firm in this market advertise, while a wheat farmer does not?
| 第几条 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MB = ΔTB | 1,500 | 1,200 | 900 | 600 | 300 | 100 |
| MC = ΔTC | 400 | 500 | 600 | 700 | 800 | 900 |
| 净收益 TB − TC | 1,100 | 1,800 | 2,100 | 2,000 | 1,500 | 700 |
练习 Practice 4.4(一)· 特征、需求与广告
以下为历年 AP 真题(带图、表和收益矩阵的题按原题重绘),点选项即时判分并显示解析。
- monopoly
- perfectly competitive
- monopolistically competitive
- oligopolistic
- monopsonistic
- Market Structure: Perfect competition;Barriers to Entry: Low;Long-Run Economic Profits: Negative
- Market Structure: Perfect competition;Barriers to Entry: High;Long-Run Economic Profits: Positive
- Market Structure: Monopolistic competition;Barriers to Entry: Low;Long-Run Economic Profits: Zero
- Market Structure: Monopolistic competition;Barriers to Entry: High;Long-Run Economic Profits: Positive
- Market Structure: Monopolistic competition;Barriers to Entry: High;Long-Run Economic Profits: Zero
- In perfect competition there are no barriers to entry, but there are strong barriers in monopolistic competition.
- In perfect competition there are many firms, but in monopolistic competition there are only a few firms.
- In perfect competition the firms all sell products that are exactly the same, but in monopolistic competition each firm sells a slightly differentiated product.
- In perfect competition firms maximize profit by selling the quantity where marginal revenue equals marginal cost, but in monopolistic competition firms maximize profit by selling the quantity where marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost.
- In perfect competition there are few consumers, but in monopolistic competition there are many consumers.
- Price is equal to average revenue.
- Individual firms produce output where marginal cost equals marginal revenue.
- Firms can affect the selling price of their product.
- The market has a large number of firms.
- Firms can easily enter or exit the market.
- there are a large number of firms
- the product is produced by using scarce resources
- the products produced by different firms are not identical
- it is easy for firms to enter or exit the market
- the marginal cost rises as output produced increases
- Its hamburgers are a perfect substitute for other types of fast food.
- Its hamburgers are differentiated.
- The demand for its hamburgers is perfectly elastic.
- The other competitive fast-food restaurants decrease the price for their hamburgers.
- The barriers to entry are very low for entrepreneurs trying to enter the fast-food business.
- Economies of scale in production
- The production of a differentiated product
- The absence of perfectly competitive firms that produce similar products
- Barriers to entry allowing firms to earn economic profit
- The maintenance of excess capacity to meet unexpected increase in demand
- A high degree of product differentiation
- A highly elastic supply curve for the firm
- High barriers to entry in this industry
- A high degree of product substitutability
- A small number of competitors
- shift the demand curve for its product to the left
- make the demand for its product less price elastic
- make its product more similar to its competitors’
- increase its positive externalities
- reduce the industry’s barriers to entry
- reduce a firm’s short-run average total cost
- minimize a firm’s long-run average total cost
- make a firm’s demand curve more elastic
- make a firm’s demand curve less elastic
- shift a firm’s demand curve to the left
- It is the same as the demand curve because there are many firms in the market.
- It is the same as the demand curve because marginal revenue is always equal to price.
- It is upward sloping because total revenue increases as the quantity sold increases.
- It lies below the demand curve because the firm must lower its price for all units in order to increase sales.
- It lies below the demand curve because marginal revenue increases when price decreases.
- Monopolistic Competition: MR>P;Perfect Competition: MR=P
- Monopolistic Competition: MR<P;Perfect Competition: MR=P
- Monopolistic Competition: MR decreases when P increases.;Perfect Competition: MR increases when P decreases.
- Monopolistic Competition: MR=P;Perfect Competition: MR=P
- Monopolistic Competition: MR=P;Perfect Competition: MR<P
Short Run 短期:可能盈利,也可能亏损
短期内店数来不及变化,一家店可能赚钱、可能亏钱,也可能刚好不赚不亏——取决于需求在 MR = MC 的产量处高于还是低于 ATC。
- 产量:MR = MC;价格:读需求。
- P > ATC 盈利,P = ATC 正常利润,P < ATC 亏损。
- 亏损时:P ≥ AVC 继续营业;P < AVC 停业(产量为 0)。
A fried-chicken shop near a university is one of many shops selling slightly different fried chicken. It faces the demand curve P = 34 − 3q, where q is hundreds of boxes per week. Its marginal cost is MC = 2 + 2q and its average total cost is ATC = 2 + q + 36/q.
(a) Write the equation of the shop's MR curve. (b) Find the profit-maximizing quantity and price. (c) Calculate the shop's economic profit. (d) What will happen in this market in the long run? (e) In the long run the shop's demand becomes P = 26 − 3q. Find the long-run quantity, price, and economic profit.
练习 Practice 4.4(二)· 短期决策
以下为历年 AP 真题(带图、表和收益矩阵的题按原题重绘),点选项即时判分并显示解析。
- Accounting profits are less than economic profits.
- Marginal cost is greater than price.
- Marginal revenue is less than price.
- Average total cost is greater than price.
- Marginal revenue is less than marginal cost.
- Total revenue is maximized when the firm produces 100 units of output.
- Marginal revenue equals $50 when the firm produces 100 units of output.
- Marginal cost is greater than marginal revenue when the firm produces 150 units of output.
- Marginal cost is minimized when the firm produces 100 units of output.
- Average total cost is minimized when the firm produces 100 units of output.
- $3
- $5
- $300
- $500
- $2,000
- −$300
- $120
- $180
- $240
- $300
- Greencom would earn more profit by decreasing output
- Greencom would earn more profit by increasing output
- Greencom is earning zero economic profit
- Greencom is earning negative economic profit
- Greencom is earning positive economic profit
| Quantity | Price ($) | Total Cost ($) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 10 | 11 |
| 2 | 8 | 14 |
| 3 | 7 | 18 |
| 4 | 5 | 25 |
| 5 | 3 | 34 |
- −$19
- −$5
- −$1
- $2
- $3
- Marginal revenue equals marginal cost and price is greater than average total cost.
- Marginal revenue equals marginal cost and price is greater than average variable cost.
- Marginal revenue equals marginal cost and price is less than average variable cost.
- Price equals both marginal cost and marginal revenue.
- Price is less than marginal revenue, but greater than average variable cost.
- The firm will increase its output to increase its revenue.
- The firm will increase the price of its output by the same amount.
- The firm’s average total cost and marginal cost curves will shift upward.
- The firm’s average fixed cost will decrease as it decreases production.
- The firm’s fixed cost will increase, but its output level will be unaffected.
- Price: P1;Quantity: Q1
- Price: P2;Quantity: Q4
- Price: P3;Quantity: Q3
- Price: P4;Quantity: Q2
- Price: P5;Quantity: Q1
- zero, because P < AVC
- Q1, because MR = MC
- Q2, because P = MC
- Q3, because MC = ATC
- impossible to determine
- It will increase output to Q2 and lower price to P2 to minimize losses.
- It will increase output to Q3 and raise price to P4 to earn zero economic profit.
- It will produce Q1 and set price equal to marginal revenue.
- It will exit the industry.
- It will build a larger plant to achieve decreasing returns to scale.
Long Run 长期:进入与退出把利润推到 0
垄断竞争的长期调整和完全竞争一样靠进入与退出;不同的是,完全竞争是“市场价格”在变,而垄断竞争是“每家店面对的需求”在移动。点按钮一步一步看:
如果一开始是亏损,过程反过来:
- 经济利润 = 0(只赚正常利润),这一点和完全竞争相同。
- 相切点在 ATC 最低点的左边(向下倾斜的需求只能在 ATC 下降的那一段与它相切),所以 MC < ATC,产量小于 ATC 最低的产量。
- P > MR = MC,所以 P > MC,这一点和垄断相同。
- 长期利润为 0 不等于“P = MC”。垄断竞争长期是 P = ATC,不是 P = MC。
- 长期均衡的相切点不是 ATC 最低点,也不是 MC 与 ATC 的交点(选项里写“MC = ATC”的是完全竞争)。
- “短期还是长期?”看利润:图上 P > ATC 或 P < ATC 都只能是短期;P = ATC(相切)才是长期。
大学城的炸鸡店,每家成本都是 MC = 2 + 2q,ATC = 2 + q + 36/q。店越多,每家分到的顾客越少:每家面对的需求是 P = a − 3q,其中 a = 46 − 2 × 店数。拖动店数,看一家店的利润;或者点“让市场自己调整”,看进入和退出把利润推向 0。
Efficiency 产能过剩与 P > MC
| 长期均衡 | 完全竞争 | 垄断竞争 | 垄断(有进入壁垒) |
|---|---|---|---|
| 企业的需求 | 水平(P = MR) | 向下倾斜、较平 | 市场需求,向下倾斜 |
| 产量规则 | MR = MC | MR = MC | MR = MC |
| P 与 ATC | P = ATC | P = ATC(相切) | 通常 P > ATC |
| 经济利润 | 0 | 0 | 可以 > 0 |
| P 与 MC | P = MC | P > MC | P > MC |
| 是否在 min ATC 生产 | 是 | 否(产能过剩) | 一般否 |
| 配置效率 / 生产效率 | 有 / 有 | 无 / 无 | 无 / 无 |
Continue with the fried-chicken shop in long-run equilibrium (P = 26 − 3q, MC = 2 + 2q, ATC = 2 + q + 36/q, q = 3, P = $17). (a) At what quantity is ATC minimized, and what is the minimum ATC? (b) How large is the shop's excess capacity? (c) Compare price with marginal cost. (d) Find the allocatively efficient quantity for this shop's demand, the deadweight loss, and the consumer surplus at the long-run equilibrium. (e) If this were a perfectly competitive industry with the same costs, what would the long-run price be?
The graph shows a monopolistically competitive firm in long-run equilibrium. Using the labels, identify (a) the profit-maximizing quantity and price, (b) the firm's economic profit, (c) the amount of excess capacity, (d) the allocatively efficient quantity and the area of deadweight loss, and (e) the price that would prevail if the firm's demand were perfectly elastic in long-run equilibrium.
A city has 60 nail salons. Each offers its own designs, service, and location, and opening a new salon is easy. (a) Identify the market structure. (b) A celebrity makes nail art popular, and salons earn positive economic profit. In the long run, what happens to the number of salons, the demand facing a typical salon, and its economic profit? (c) Compare a typical salon's long-run price and output with those of a perfectly competitive firm with the same costs. (d) Suppose instead the city requires a license and issues only 5 licenses. Can salons earn positive economic profit in the long run? Explain.
练习 Practice 4.4(三)· 长期均衡与效率
以下为历年 AP 真题(带图、表和收益矩阵的题按原题重绘),点选项即时判分并显示解析。
- produce a lower level of output at a higher average cost than do perfectly competitive firms
- use production processes that are more capital-intensive than do perfectly competitive firms
- face downward-sloping demand curves, ensuring that marginal revenue is greater than average revenue
- produce at that level of output where price equals marginal cost
- realize diseconomies of scale
- Price is greater than marginal cost, and marginal revenue is equal to average total cost.
- Price is greater than marginal revenue, and marginal cost is equal to average total cost.
- Price is greater than marginal revenue, and marginal cost is greater than average total cost.
- Marginal revenue is equal to marginal cost, and price is equal to average total cost.
- Marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost, and price is equal to average total cost.
- P > ATC, MR = MC, and P > MC
- P > ATC, MR > MC, and P = MC
- P = ATC, MR = MC, and P > MC
- P = ATC, MR = MC, and P = MC
- P = ATC, MR > MC, and P > MC
- It earns a normal profit.
- It sets price equal to marginal cost.
- It is allocatively efficient.
- It is a price taker.
- It produces at minimum average total cost.
- In equilibrium, the marginal benefit exceeds the price charged by the firms.
- In equilibrium, the marginal benefit exceeds the marginal cost of production.
- In equilibrium, the marginal revenue of the firm is not equal to its marginal cost.
- In long-run equilibrium, the firm is earning economic profits.
- Firms exhibit significant market power and therefore the number of firms in the industry is strictly limited.
- Price equals marginal cost and average total cost.
- Price equals average total cost but is greater than marginal cost.
- Price equals marginal cost and is greater than average total cost.
- The firm makes no attempt to differentiate its products.
- The firm earns positive economic profits by producing at minimum average cost.
- Price exceeds marginal revenue, and the firm earns positive economic profits.
- Price equals marginal revenue, and the firm earns positive economic profits.
- Price equals marginal cost, and the firm earns zero economic profits.
- Price exceeds marginal cost, and the firm earns zero economic profits.
- Price exceeds marginal cost, and the firm earns positive economic profits.
- The firm produces the allocatively efficient level of output.
- The firm is allocatively inefficient, because it produces an output level at which price is greater than marginal cost.
- The firm produces an output level that minimizes average total cost.
- The firm produces in the inelastic range of its demand curve.
- The firm earns positive economic profits but zero accounting profits.
- price equals the marginal value to the buyer of the last item produced
- price is greater than marginal cost
- excessive competition prevents other firms from entering the market
- homogeneous goods are usually overpriced
- short-run economic profit-making opportunities exist
- It produces where price equals marginal cost, and it earns zero economic profits.
- It produces where marginal revenue exceeds marginal cost, and it earns positive economic profits.
- It produces where marginal cost equals marginal revenue, and the price is equal to average total cost.
- It produces at the minimum average total cost, and it utilizes all excess capacity.
- It produces more than the allocatively efficient quantity, and the price is greater than marginal cost.
- Price is greater than marginal cost.
- Marginal cost is greater than minimum average total cost.
- Marginal revenue is greater than marginal cost.
- There is an overallocation of resources to the market.
- Products are homogeneous.
- Economic profits equal zero, and price equals marginal cost.
- Economic profits equal zero, and price equals marginal revenue.
- Marginal revenue equals marginal cost, and profits are positive.
- Economic profits equal zero, and marginal revenue equals marginal cost.
- Economic profits equal zero, and price exceeds marginal cost.
- Marginal cost is greater than marginal revenue.
- Price is greater than marginal cost.
- Price is equal to average total cost.
- Price is equal to marginal cost.
- Marginal revenue is equal to average revenue.
4.5Oligopoly and Game Theory 寡头与博弈论
全世界的大型客机几乎只有波音和空客两家在造;手机操作系统基本只剩 iOS 和 Android。在这样的市场里,每家企业做决定之前都要先想:“我这样做,对手会怎么回应?”——这就是寡头,而分析“猜对手”的工具叫博弈论。
Characteristics 寡头的特征
- 进入壁垒高:规模经济、巨额启动成本、专利、牌照、网络效应等,新企业很难进来,所以经济利润在长期也可能保持。
- 相互依存(interdependent):一家的利润直接取决于对手的选择,所以每家都要考虑对手的反应——这是寡头区别于其他三种结构的最主要特征。
- 产品可以相同(钢铁、水泥、原油)也可以有差异(汽车、手机、碳酸饮料)。
- 没有效率:价格高于边际成本(P > MC),产量低于社会最优。
Collusion and Cartels 合谋与卡特尔(CED PRD-3.C.2)
Cartel 卡特尔:以正式协议来合谋的企业集团。最有名的例子是石油输出国组织 OPEC,成员国约定各自的产油量。
在美国等许多国家,企业之间的合谋定价是违法的(反垄断法,见 Unit 6)。有时企业不明说,却心照不宣地维持高价,叫默契合谋(tacit collusion),常见形式是价格领导(price leadership):一家先定价,其他家跟随。合谋破裂、大家竞相降价,就是价格战(price war)。
合谋能让大家都多赚钱,为什么还经常破裂?看一个例子:
Polar Ice and Frosty Ice are the only two ice makers on a hot island. Market demand is P = 20 − Q, where Q is hundreds of bags per day. Each firm's marginal cost and average total cost are constant at $4 per bag.
(a) If the two firms form a cartel and act like a single monopoly, find the market quantity, the price, and each firm's profit when they split output equally. (b) Frosty keeps the agreement and produces 4 (hundred bags), but Polar secretly produces 5. Find the new price and each firm's profit. (c) Each firm can produce 4 or 5. Complete the payoff matrix, identify each firm's dominant strategy, and identify the Nash equilibrium. (d) Compare the Nash equilibrium price and quantity with the cartel outcome and with perfect competition.
| Frosty | |||
| Produce 4 | Produce 5 | ||
| Polar | Produce 4 | $32, $32 | $28, $35 |
| Produce 5 | $35, $28 | $30, $30 | |
- 企业数量多:每家作弊对价格的影响小,又更难互相监督。
- 进入容易:高价会吸引新企业进来,新企业不受协议约束。
- 难以监督:价格和销量不公开、产品和定价方式复杂,作弊不容易被发现。
- 成本或利益不同:各家想要的价格不一样,很难谈拢;买方实力强、需求波动大,也会让协议破裂。
海岛上只有 Polar 和 Frosty 两家制冰厂。市场需求 P = 20 − Q(Q:百袋/天),每袋成本都是 $4。两家约定各产 4。拖动两家的产量,看价格、各自利润和总利润怎么变。
练习 Practice 4.5(一)· 寡头、合谋与卡特尔
以下为历年 AP 真题(带图、表和收益矩阵的题按原题重绘),点选项即时判分并显示解析。
- Many sellers with identical products and no barriers to entry
- Many sellers, each with a clearly differentiated product, and no barriers to entry
- A few competing sellers with similar products and high barriers to entry
- A few competing sellers of identical products and no barriers to entry
- No competition among sellers and high barriers to entry
- A market with a single firm that faces no competition
- A market where a few firms have significant market share
- A market with low barriers to entry
- A market with many firms selling differentiated products
- A market with many firms earning zero economic profits in the long run
- CoffeeBar can sell as many cups of coffee as it wants at the market price but will lose all its customers if it charges a higher price.
- CoffeeBar is the only coffee shop in town with complete market power to charge high prices and earns positive economic profit in the long run.
- CoffeeBar is the only employer of beverage service workers in town and pays a fixed wage to all hired workers.
- CoffeeBar sets its own price for its coffee beverages, but because it is one of many coffee shops in town, it earns zero economic profit in the long run.
- CoffeeBar is one of only two coffee shops in town and is constantly offering promotions and discounts to steal customers from the other coffee shop.
- an oligopoly
- monopolistic competition
- perfect competition
- a monopoly
- a cartel
- perfectly competitive
- a pure monopoly
- a natural monopoly
- an oligopoly
- a monopsony
- labor markets
- perfect competition
- monopsony
- oligopoly
- monopoly
- Oligopoly
- Monopoly
- Perfect competition
- Unregulated natural monopoly
- Monopsony
- are regulated by a state agency or federal agency
- consider each other’s decisions
- advertise their products
- produce differentiated products
- produce identical products
- Perfect competition
- Monopolistic competition
- Oligopoly
- Monopoly
- Natural monopoly
- They produce the allocatively efficient quantity.
- They face a perfectly elastic demand curve.
- They have identical cost curves.
- They coordinate their production decisions.
- They agree to remove barriers to entry.
- equal to the marginal cost of production
- equal to the average total cost of production
- above the marginal cost of production
- above the monopoly price
- below the average variable cost of production
- There is an unavoidable conflict in that a collusive agreement can increase the profits of some, but not all, firms in the industry.
- There is little potential for gain from collusion unless there is a large number of consumers in the market.
- Each firm in the industry views itself as facing a vertical demand curve, even though the market demand curve is downward sloping.
- The firms in the industry have a common incentive to increase output to a more competitive level.
- Each firm realizes that its profits would increase if it were the only firm to violate the collusive agreement by increasing its production slightly.
- Consumers substitute away from the good when the price increases.
- Individual cartel members are tempted to cheat on the agreement.
- Although the total gain to cartel members is positive, all members lose when everyone sticks to the agreement.
- Some firms will reduce output in an effort to lower costs of production.
- Oligopolistic behavior is generally predictable.
- It is easy for new firms to enter into the industry.
- All of the firms have identical costs.
- The number of firms is few.
- Firms' sales are widely reported.
- The market demand is stable.
Games and Payoff Matrices 博弈与收益矩阵(CED PRD-3.C.3–C.4)
- Game 博弈:几个参与者各自行动,每个人的收益同时取决于自己和别人的选择。
- Players 参与者:AP 只考两个参与者。
- Strategy 策略:一个完整的行动计划(定高价/定低价、做广告/不做广告……)。AP 只考每人两个策略。
- Payoff 收益:每种策略组合下每个人得到的结果(通常是利润)。把所有组合的收益列成表,就是收益矩阵(payoff matrix,也叫 normal form)。
读矩阵的约定:行参与者在左边,列参与者在上面;每格第一个数是行参与者的收益,第二个数是列参与者的收益。本讲义用蓝色表示行参与者、橙色表示列参与者。
| Frosty | |||
| Produce 4 | Produce 5 | ||
| Polar | Produce 4 | $32, $32 | $28, $35 |
| Produce 5 | $35, $28 | $30, $30 | |
Dominant Strategy 优势策略(CED PRD-3.C.5)
Best response 最优反应:给定对方某个选择时,自己收益最高的策略。如果两种情况下的最优反应是同一个策略,它就是优势策略;如果最优反应随对方而变,就没有优势策略。
FitBox and IronHouse are the only two gyms in a small town. Each gym decides whether to offer a New Year discount. The matrix shows their profits in thousands of dollars; the first entry is FitBox's profit and the second is IronHouse's. They choose simultaneously and independently, and both know all the payoffs.
| IronHouse | |||
| Discount | No Discount | ||
| FitBox | Discount | $30, $20 | $50, $25 |
| No Discount | $25, $35 | $45, $32 | |
(a) If IronHouse offers a discount, what is FitBox's best response? (b) Does FitBox have a dominant strategy? Explain using numbers from the matrix. (c) Does IronHouse have a dominant strategy? Explain. (d) Identify the Nash equilibrium. (e) If the two gyms merged and kept both locations, which combination would maximize their combined profit?
| IronHouse | |||
| Discount | No Discount | ||
| FitBox | Discount | $30, $20 | $50, $25 |
| No Discount | $25, $35 | $45, $32 | |
Nash Equilibrium 纳什均衡(CED PRD-3.C.6)
最快的找法是划线法:把每个参与者在每种情况下的最优反应划线,两个数都被划线的格子就是纳什均衡。点按钮一步一步看:
| Frosty | |||
| Produce 4 | Produce 5 | ||
| Polar | Produce 4 | $32, $32 | $28, $35 |
| Produce 5 | $35, $28 | $30, $30 | |
| Frosty | |||
| Produce 4 | Produce 5 | ||
| Polar | Produce 4 | $32, $32 | $28, $35 |
| Produce 5 | $35, $28 | $30, $30 | |
| Frosty | |||
| Produce 4 | Produce 5 | ||
| Polar | Produce 4 | $32, $32 | $28, $35 |
| Produce 5 | $35, $28 | $30, $30 | |
- 双方都有优势策略 → 双方都选它,这个格子一定是(唯一的)纳什均衡(“dominant strategy equilibrium”)。
- 只有一方有优势策略 → 它选优势策略,另一方对它做最优反应。
- 都没有优势策略 → 用划线法逐格检查:可能有 2 个均衡,也可能 1 个都没有。
- 纳什均衡不一定是双方总收益最大的格子,也不一定对双方最好。
(a) In a penalty kick, the kicker chooses Left or Right and the goalie dives Left or Right at the same moment. The kicker wins (payoff 1) if the two choose different sides; the goalie wins (payoff 1) if the two choose the same side; the loser gets 0. Is there a Nash equilibrium? (b) Ann and Ben want to meet on Saturday but their phones are dead. Each chooses the Library or the Cafe. If they go to the same place, Ann gets 10 at the Library and 8 at the Cafe, while Ben gets 8 at the Library and 10 at the Cafe; if they miss each other, both get 0. Find all Nash equilibria. Does either player have a dominant strategy?
选一个博弈,点你认为是纳什均衡的格子(可以点多个,也可以一个都不点),再点“检查”。卡住了就先点“划线”看双方的最优反应。(已答对 0 / 个博弈)
练习 Practice 4.5(二)· 博弈论与优势策略
以下为历年 AP 真题(带图、表和收益矩阵的题按原题重绘),点选项即时判分并显示解析。
- Perfect competition
- Monopolistic competition
- Oligopoly
- Monopoly
- Monopsony
- independent of one another
- price takers
- regulated by government
- altruistic
- interdependent
- firms are price takers
- there is only one producer
- there are many small producers
- products are identical for all firms
- there are interdependent firms
- why firms price discriminate
- how monopolies evolve into oligopolies
- strategic behavior of firms in oligopoly
- profit maximization in monopoly
- price leadership of monopolistic competition
- independent of the other player’s choice
- dependent on the other player’s choice
- the strategy that results in the maximum combined payoff for both players
- the strategy that always delivers the other player’s best outcome of the game
- the strategy that always delivers the other player’s worst outcome of the game
- Nash equilibrium
- Price discrimination
- Dominant strategy
- Prisoner’s Dilemma
- Collusion
- Maintain that strategy independent of the strategies chosen by its competitor.
- Adjust its strategies based on the strategies chosen by its competitor.
- Make the first move, and wait to see whether its competitor responds to the move.
- Keep its competitor guessing about its next move.
- Collude with its competitor to reduce uncertainty.
| Tara | |||
| High | Low | ||
| Pam | High | $40, $40 | $20, $70 |
| Low | $70, $20 | $30, $30 | |
- If Pam sets the high price, Tara will do best by charging the low price.
- If Pam sets the low price, Tara will do best by charging the high price.
- The dominant strategy for both is to charge the high price.
- The dominant strategy for Tara is to set the low price and for Pam is to set the high price.
- Neither Tara nor Pam has a dominant strategy.
The table below shows the profits associated with the strategies of two oligopolistic firms, Lock and Star, that must choose between a high price and a low price for their products. The first entry in each box is the profits received by Lock, and the second entry is the profits received by Star.
| Star | |||
| High Price | Low Price | ||
| Lock | High Price | $70, $70 | −$20, $50 |
| Low Price | $50, −$20 | $40, $40 | |
- low price and earn a profit of $40
- low price and earn a profit of $50
- high price and earn a profit of $50
- high price and earn a profit of $70
- high price and incur a loss of $20
| UB | |||
| Reduces Production by 20 Percent | Reduces Production by 10 Percent | ||
| UA | Reduces Production by 20 Percent | $150, $150 | $50, $250 |
| Reduces Production by 10 Percent | $250, $50 | $100, $100 | |
- Neither company has a dominant strategy.
- Both companies have an incentive to reduce production by 10%.
- Both companies have an incentive to reduce production by 20%.
- Only UA has an incentive to reduce production by 20%.
- Only UB has an incentive to reduce production by 20%.
| Farmingdale | |||
| Farmingdale charges high price. | Farmingdale charges low price. | ||
| Agronomia | Agronomia charges high price. | $150, $150 | $50, $300 |
| Agronomia charges low price. | $300, $50 | $100, $100 | |
- Agronomia’s Profit: $50;Farmingdale’s Profit: $100
- Agronomia’s Profit: $150;Farmingdale’s Profit: $150
- Agronomia’s Profit: $300;Farmingdale’s Profit: $50
- Agronomia’s Profit: $100;Farmingdale’s Profit: $100
- Agronomia’s Profit: $300;Farmingdale’s Profit: $300
| Beta | |||
| Raise Price | Do Not Raise Price | ||
| Alpha | Raise Price | $100, $100 | $30, $120 |
| Do Not Raise Price | $110, $20 | $50, $70 | |
- Alpha: Do not raise price;Beta: Do not raise price
- Alpha: Do not raise price;Beta: Raise price
- Alpha: Raise price;Beta: No dominant strategy
- Alpha: Raise price;Beta: Do not raise price
- Alpha: No dominant strategy;Beta: Raise price
| R Soda | |||
| Low Price | High Price | ||
| E Soda | Low Price | $25, $25 | $90, $15 |
| High Price | $15, $90 | $75, $75 | |
- neither E Soda nor R Soda has a dominant strategy
- E Soda has a dominant strategy but R Soda does not
- R Soda has a dominant strategy but E Soda does not
- both firms will choose the high-price strategy
- both firms will choose the low-price strategy
Prisoner's Dilemma 囚徒困境(CED PRD-3.C.7)
这正是寡头难以维持垄断结果的原因(CED PRD-3.C.7)。不过寡头的结果仍然比完全竞争“差”:价格更高、产量更低。
| 制冰市场 | Q | P | 两家总利润 | 消费者剩余 | DWL |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 卡特尔(= 垄断) | 8 | $12 | 64 | 32 | 32 |
| 寡头纳什均衡(各产 5) | 10 | $10 | 60 | 50 | 18 |
| 完全竞争 | 16 | $4 | 0 | 128 | 0 |
单位:百美元/天。消费者剩余 = ½ × (20 − P) × Q;DWL = ½ × (P − 4) × (16 − Q)。
Changing Payoffs and Mergers 收益改变、激励与合并
近年 FRQ 的博弈题,后两问几乎总是:“某个收益变了(征税、补贴、罚款、成本变化、一方给另一方钱),重画矩阵 / 新的纳什均衡是什么”“收益至少要变多少,某个策略才会成为优势策略”“两家合并后最大总利润是多少”。
- 重画矩阵:只改受影响的那一方、那几格的数字;没受影响的数原样照抄,玩家名字和策略名也要写上。
- 至少要多少激励(CED PRD-3.C 学习目标 c):对每一种“对方的选择”算出需要的差额,取较大的那个,而且要严格大于它(等于时两个策略一样好,不是严格的优势策略)。
- 合并 / 合谋:合并后的企业只关心总利润 → 把每格两个数相加,选最大的一格。
Aurora Motors and Bison Auto are the only two carmakers in a country. Each decides whether its new model will be Electric or Gas. The matrix shows profits in millions of dollars (Aurora's first). They choose simultaneously and independently with complete information.
| Bison | |||
| Electric | Gas | ||
| Aurora | Electric | $40, $40 | $50, $60 |
| Gas | $70, $45 | $55, $50 | |
(a) Identify each firm's dominant strategy, if any, and the Nash equilibrium. (b) The government will give a subsidy to any firm that chooses Electric. What is the minimum subsidy that would make Electric a dominant strategy for Aurora? (c) Suppose the subsidy is $10 million for each firm that chooses Electric. Redraw the matrix and identify all Nash equilibria. (d) Without any subsidy, if the two firms merged, which combination would maximize their combined profit?
| Bison | |||
| Electric | Gas | ||
| Aurora | Electric | $50, $50 | $60, $60 |
| Gas | $70, $55 | $55, $50 | |
两家网约车平台 Swift 和 Zoom 决定要不要给乘客发补贴(单位:百万美元,第一个数是 Swift 的利润)。监管部门对每一家发补贴的平台罚款 $f。拖动罚款,看矩阵、优势策略和纳什均衡怎么变;再看看如果两家合并,会选哪一格。
- 最优反应:“If Firm B chooses X, Firm A earns $a by choosing Y, which is greater than $b by choosing Z, so A's best response is Y.”
- 优势策略:两句都写——“If B chooses X, A earns more with Y ($a > $b); if B chooses Z, A also earns more with Y ($c > $d).”
- 没有优势策略:写出两种情况下最优反应不同,并各给一组数字。
- 是不是纳什均衡:两方都要检查——“Given B's choice, A cannot do better…; given A's choice, B cannot do better…”。
练习 Practice 4.5(三)· 纳什均衡
以下为历年 AP 真题(带图、表和收益矩阵的题按原题重绘),点选项即时判分并显示解析。
| Town Herald | |||
| Do Not Change Subscription Price | Increase Subscription Price | ||
| Daily Voice | Do Not Change Subscription Price | $500, $400 | $200, $700 |
| Increase Subscription Price | $600, $300 | $300, $100 | |
- Do Not Change Subscription Price is a dominant strategy for Daily Voice.
- Do Not Change Subscription Price is a dominant strategy for Town Herald.
- Increase Subscription Price is a dominant strategy for Daily Voice.
- Increase Subscription Price is a dominant strategy for Town Herald.
- There are no dominant strategies in the above payoff matrix.
- If one firm has a dominant strategy, then the other firm does not have a dominant strategy.
- If one firm has a dominant strategy, then the other firm also has a dominant strategy.
- Both firms must have dominant strategies.
- If one firm has a dominant strategy, then there is no Nash equilibrium.
- If both firms have dominant strategies, then there is a Nash equilibrium.
- Genezyz charges a lower price to its customers than Creative does.
- Neither firm has a dominant strategy.
- Neither firm could earn higher profits by unilaterally changing its project choice.
- Creative could earn a higher profit if it chose a different project when Genezyz chose its initial project.
- The combined profits of the two firms are maximized at the current combination of project choices.
| JCM | |||
| Project X | Project Y | ||
| RKB | Project Alpha | $300, $400 | $250, $250 |
| Project Beta | $350, $250 | $400, $300 | |
- There is no combination of project choices that results in a Nash equilibrium.
- There are multiple combinations of project choices that result in Nash equilibria.
- RKB has a dominant strategy, but JCM does not.
- JCM has a dominant strategy, but RKB does not.
- Neither firm has a dominant strategy.
The two firms in an industry are deciding whether to advertise. The profit to each firm depends on the other firm’s decision. The first entries in the matrix below indicate the profit earned, in millions of dollars, by Firm A; and the second entries indicate the profits earned, in millions of dollars, by Firm B.
| Firm B | |||
| Advertise | Do Not Advertise | ||
| Firm A | Advertise | $7, $1 | $5, $4 |
| Do Not Advertise | $3, $2 | $2, $0 | |
- Firm A always gets a smaller share of the industry profits.
- Firm A’s dominant strategy is to advertise.
- Firm B’s dominant strategy is not to advertise.
- The dominant strategy for both firms is not to advertise.
- Neither firm has a dominant strategy.
The two firms in an industry are deciding whether to advertise. The profit to each firm depends on the other firm’s decision. The first entries in the matrix below indicate the profit earned, in millions of dollars, by Firm A; and the second entries indicate the profits earned, in millions of dollars, by Firm B.
| Firm B | |||
| Advertise | Do Not Advertise | ||
| Firm A | Advertise | $7, $1 | $5, $4 |
| Do Not Advertise | $3, $2 | $2, $0 | |
- it is best for each firm given what the other firm has chosen
- the total industry profits are maximized
- Firm A has an incentive to change its strategy and chooses not to advertise
- it is the best outcome for Firm B regardless of what firm A does
- advertising is always the best strategy for Firm A
| Nature View | |||
| Bids High | Bids Low | ||
| Evergreen | Bids High | $600, $300 | $520, $400 |
| Bids Low | $720, $100 | $500, $200 | |
- When Evergreen bids low, no matter what Nature View’s bid is
- When both firms bid high and when both firms bid low
- When Evergreen bids high and Nature View bids low
- When both firms bid low
- When both firms bid high
| South Springs | |||
| Maintain Output | Increase Output | ||
| North Springs | Maintain Output | $15, $30 | $15, $45 |
| Increase Output | $30, $26 | $27, $28 | |
- Dominant Strategy: None;Nash Equilibrium: ($27, $28)
- Dominant Strategy: ($27, $28);Nash Equilibrium: ($15, $45)
- Dominant Strategy: ($30, $26);Nash Equilibrium: ($15, $45)
- Dominant Strategy: ($27, $28);Nash Equilibrium: ($27, $28)
- Dominant Strategy: ($30, $26);Nash Equilibrium: ($27, $28)
| Frank’s Barbecue | |||
| Advertise | Not Advertise | ||
| Nick’s Barbecue | Advertise | $600, $100 | $360, $250 |
| Not Advertise | $370, $140 | $350, $150 | |
- Nick’s Barbecue’s dominant strategy is Advertise, and Frank’s Barbecue’s dominant strategy is Advertise.
- Nick’s Barbecue’s dominant strategy is to Advertise, and Frank’s Barbecue’s dominant strategy is to Not Advertise.
- Nick’s Barbecue’s dominant strategy is Not Advertise, and Frank’s Barbecue’s dominant strategy is Advertise.
- Nick’s Barbecue’s dominant strategy is to Not Advertise, and Frank’s Barbecue’s dominant strategy is to Not Advertise.
- Nick’s Barbecue’s dominant strategy is Advertise, and Frank’s Barbecue does not have a dominant strategy.
ΣSummary 本册总结与易错点
4.4 垄断竞争 · 特征与短期
企业很多、产品有差异、进出自由。需求向下倾斜但较有弹性,MR < P;MR = MC 定产量,从需求读价格。短期可能盈利、亏损或正常利润;P < AVC 停业。广告让需求增加、更缺乏弹性,广告费提高 ATC。4.4 垄断竞争 · 长期与效率
盈利 → 进入 → 每家需求左移;亏损 → 退出 → 需求右移;直到需求与 ATC 相切:MR = MC,P = ATC(零利润),P > MC。切点在 ATC 最低点左边 → 产能过剩,既无配置效率也无生产效率;价格高于、产量低于完全竞争。4.5 寡头 · 合谋与卡特尔
少数企业、进入壁垒高、相互依存,P > MC。合谋(卡特尔)让它们像垄断一样限产抬价;但卡特尔价格下 P > MC,每家都有偷偷多卖的动机,所以卡特尔不稳定。企业多、进入容易、难以监督时更容易破裂。4.5 博弈论
收益矩阵:第一个数属于行参与者。最优反应:固定对方选择比较自己的收益。优势策略:不管对方选什么都最好。纳什均衡:互为最优反应,没人想单独改变(划线法:两个数都被划线)。可能有 0、1、2 个纳什均衡。囚徒困境:都选优势策略,结果对双方都更差。4.5 收益改变与合并
重画矩阵只改受影响的数。让某策略成为优势策略的最小激励 = 各种情况下所需差额中较大的那个,且要严格大于。合并后选两数之和最大的格子。寡头的结果介于垄断与完全竞争之间:价格高于、产量低于完全竞争。Unit 4 Panorama 四种市场结构全景
| 完全竞争 | 垄断竞争 | 寡头 | 垄断 | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 企业数量 | 非常多 | 很多 | 少数几家(相互依存) | 一家 |
| 产品 | 完全相同 | 有差异 | 相同或有差异 | 没有相近替代品 |
| 进入壁垒 | 没有 | 很低 | 高 | 非常高 |
| 企业的需求 | 水平,P = MR | 向下倾斜,较有弹性,MR < P | 向下倾斜,取决于对手 | 市场需求,MR < P |
| 产量规则 | MR = MC,价格从需求读(完全竞争 P = MR,所以就是 P = MC) | |||
| P 与 MC | P = MC | P > MC | P > MC | P > MC |
| 长期经济利润 | 0 | 0(需求与 ATC 相切) | 可以 > 0 | 可以 > 0 |
| 配置效率 | 有 | 无 | 无 | 无(完全价格歧视除外) |
| 生产效率(长期) | 有(min ATC) | 无(产能过剩) | 一般无 | 一般无 |
| 典型例子 | 小麦、鸡蛋批发 | 餐馆、理发店、服装品牌 | 客机、手机系统、可乐 | 自来水、专利新药 |
| 讲义位置 | Unit 3(下) | 4.4(本册) | 4.5(本册) | 4.2–4.3(上册) |
- 垄断竞争企业的需求向下倾斜是因为企业多 ✗ → 是因为产品有差异。
- 广告让需求更有弹性 ✗ → 广告让需求更缺乏弹性(并增加需求)。
- 垄断竞争长期均衡 P = MC ✗ → P = ATC > MC,而 MR = MC。
- 长期相切点就是 ATC 最低点 ✗ → 在最低点左边(MC < ATC),所以有产能过剩。
- 长期利润为 0,所以垄断竞争有效率 ✗ → P > MC(配置无效率),不在 min ATC(生产无效率)。
- 垄断竞争企业时刻盯着对手的反应 ✗ → 那是寡头的特征(相互依存);垄断竞争企业太多,不必考虑某一个对手。
- 卡特尔对所有成员都有利,所以很稳定 ✗ → 每个成员都有作弊的动机,卡特尔容易破裂。
- 找行参与者的最优反应时左右比较 ✗ → 固定对方的选择(一列),上下比较第一个数。
- 纳什均衡就是总收益最大或对双方最好的格子 ✗ → 只是“没有人想单独改变”;囚徒困境里它对双方都更差。
- “至少要多少钱才能让某策略成为优势策略”取较小的差额 ✗ → 要在对方的每一种选择下都更好,取较大的差额,并且严格大于。
✎Unit 4(下)Test 本册测验
15 道选择题,全部选自历年 AP 真题(与各节练习不重复,带图和收益矩阵的题按原题重绘),建议用时 18 分钟。先全部选完,再点底部“交卷”查看得分和解析。
- Economic Profit: −$500;Long-Run Adjustment: Existing firms will exit the market.
- Economic Profit: −$5;Long-Run Adjustment: Existing firms will exit the market.
- Economic Profit: $0;Long-Run Adjustment: The market will be in long-run equilibrium.
- Economic Profit: $5;Long-Run Adjustment: New firms will enter the market.
- Economic Profit: $500;Long-Run Adjustment: New firms will enter the market.
- Short run, because price is greater than marginal cost
- Short run, because the firm is earning a positive economic profit
- Long run, because price is greater than average total cost
- Long run, because marginal revenue is not equal to zero
- Either short run or long run, because the firm is producing where marginal revenue equals marginal cost
- Firms in monopolistic competition can earn negative economic profit in the short run, but monopolies cannot.
- Firms in monopolistic competition set marginal revenue equal to marginal cost to maximize profit, but monopolies do not.
- Firms in monopolistic competition produce the socially optimal quantity of output in the long run, but monopolies do not.
- Monopolies charge a price that is greater than marginal cost, but firms in monopolistic competition do not.
- Monopolies can earn positive economic profit in the long run, but firms in monopolistic competition cannot.
- The entry of more efficient firms is blocked.
- The firm produces the quantity at which marginal cost equals average total cost.
- The firm does not produce the quantity that results in minimum average total cost.
- The firm does not produce the quantity that minimizes total cost.
- The firm’s customers value the last unit of output at less than its cost.
- P>MC; Marginal revenue is below demand; Economic profit is zero
- P<MC; Marginal revenue is below demand; Economic profit is positive
- P>MC; Marginal revenue is above demand; Economic profit is positive
- P=MR=MC; Marginal revenue is equal to demand; Economic profit is zero
- P=MR=MC; Marginal revenue is above demand; Economic profit is positive
- they charge a price equal to marginal cost
- they produce a quantity at which average total cost is not minimized
- they produce a quantity at which price equals marginal revenue
- they produce a quantity at which marginal cost is greater than average total cost
- they are experiencing diseconomies of scale
- Perfect competition
- Monopolistic competition
- Oligopoly
- Monopoly
- Monopsony
- Allocative efficiency
- Low barriers of entry
- Consideration of rivals’ reactions
- No deadweight loss
- Zero economic profit
- The firm that cheats will earn higher profits, and industry profits will be lower.
- The firm that cheats will earn higher profits, and industry profits will be higher.
- The firm that cheats will earn lower profits, and industry profits will be lower.
- The firm that cheats will earn lower profits, and industry profits will be higher.
- The firms that do not cheat will earn higher profits.
- Consumer surplus will decrease, and total economic surplus will stay the same.
- Consumer surplus will decrease, and total economic surplus will increase.
- Consumer surplus will increase, and total economic surplus will decrease.
- Consumer surplus and total economic surplus will both increase.
- Consumer surplus and total economic surplus will both decrease.
| Nature View | |||
| Bids High | Bids Low | ||
| Evergreen | Bids High | $5, $5 | $0, $6 |
| Bids Low | $6, $0 | $3, $3 | |
- Evergreen does not have a dominant strategy. Nature View’s dominant strategy is to bid high.
- Evergreen’s dominant strategy is to bid high. Nature View does not have a dominant strategy.
- Evergreen’s dominant strategy is to bid low. Nature View’s dominant strategy is to bid high.
- Evergreen’s dominant strategy is to bid high. Nature View’s dominant strategy is to bid high.
- Evergreen’s dominant strategy is to bid low. Nature View’s dominant strategy is to bid low
| Cleared4U | |||
| Recycling | Composting | ||
| Bygone2 | Recycling | $45, $47 | $42, $37 |
| Composting | $38, $43 | $40, $41 | |
- Neither firm has a dominant strategy.
- Both firms have a dominant strategy to open a new composting center.
- Both firms have a dominant strategy to open a new recycling center.
- Cleared4U has a dominant strategy to open a new recycling center, and Bygone2 has a dominant strategy to open a new composting center.
- Bygone2 has a dominant strategy to open a new recycling center, and Cleared4U has a dominant strategy to open a new composting center.
Rover’s Rest and Dave’s Den are the only two dog daycare companies in a town. Each firm is considering whether to run ads or to not run ads. The first entry in each cell shows Dave’s Den’s profit, and the second entry shows Rover’s Rest’s profit. Each dog daycare company independently and simultaneously chooses its strategy. Assume the two firms know all the information in the matrix and do not cooperate. Use the payoff matrix provided to answer the next two questions.
| Rover’s Rest | |||
| Run Ads | No Ads | ||
| Dave’s Den | Run Ads | $500, $400 | $400, $500 |
| No Ads | $700, $800 | $900, $700 | |
- Dave’s Den chooses “Run Ads,” and Rover’s Rest chooses “No Ads.”
- Both Dave’s Den and Rover’s Rest choose “Run Ads.”
- Both Dave’s Den and Rover’s Rest choose “No Ads.”
- Dave’s Den chooses “No Ads,” and Rover’s Rest chooses “Run Ads.”
- There are multiple Nash equilibria.
Rover’s Rest and Dave’s Den are the only two dog daycare companies in a town. Each firm is considering whether to run ads or to not run ads. The first entry in each cell shows Dave’s Den’s profit, and the second entry shows Rover’s Rest’s profit. Each dog daycare company independently and simultaneously chooses its strategy. Assume the two firms know all the information in the matrix and do not cooperate. Use the payoff matrix provided to answer the next two questions.
| Rover’s Rest | |||
| Run Ads | No Ads | ||
| Dave’s Den | Run Ads | $500, $400 | $400, $500 |
| No Ads | $700, $800 | $900, $700 | |
- $500
- $700
- $1,300
- $1,500
- $1,600
| Rover’s Rest | |||
| Run Ads | No Ads | ||
| Dave’s Den | Run Ads | $300, $200 | $200, $500 |
| No Ads | $700, $600 | $900, $700 | |
| Uptown Tech Company | |||
| Research and Development | Advertising | ||
| Downtown Tech Company | High Price | $500, $250 | $100, $700 |
| Low Price | $200, $400 | $600, $350 | |
- High Price, Research and Development
- Low Price, Advertising
- High Price, Advertising
- Low Price, Research and Development
- None of the strategy pairs represents a Nash equilibrium.
FRQFree-Response Practice 自由问答
前三道是 AP 真题,评分标准依照 College Board 官方 Scoring Guidelines 整理;第四道是依照 AP 题型原创的垄断竞争画图题。先在纸上完整作答(包括画图和重画矩阵),再展开对照。
The table below shows the total cost and total benefit of advertisements placed by AZY Foods, a firm in the retail food market.
| Number of Advertisements | Total Cost ($) | Total Benefit ($) |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | 300 | 1,200 |
| 2 | 500 | 2,200 |
| 3 | 800 | 3,000 |
| 4 | 1,300 | 3,600 |
| 5 | 2,100 | 4,000 |
| 6 | 3,000 | 4,200 |
| 7 | 4,100 | 4,200 |
(a) Calculate the total net benefit of placing three advertisements. Show your work.
(b) Calculate the marginal net benefit of the third advertisement. Show your work.
(c) What is the optimal number of advertisements placed by AZY Foods? Explain using marginal analysis.
(d) Suppose over the next year the marginal benefit that AZY Foods receives from each advertisement increases by $300. Identify the optimal number of advertisements.
(e) There are many firms in the retail food market. Each firm places its own firm-specific advertisements without considering the actions of its competitors. In what market structure is AZY Foods operating?
| 第几条广告 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| MB | 1,200 | 1,000 | 800 | 600 | 400 | 200 | 0 |
| MC | 300 | 200 | 300 | 500 | 800 | 900 | 1,100 |
| MB − MC | 900 | 800 | 500 | 100 | -400 | -700 | -1,100 |
| MB + 300 − MC | 1,200 | 1,100 | 800 | 400 | -100 | -400 | -800 |
| Point | 得分要求与解析 |
|---|---|
| (a) 1 pt | 总净收益 = $3,000 − $800 = $2,200(要写出算式)。 |
| (b) 1 pt | 第 3 条的边际净收益 = ($3,000 − $2,200) − ($800 − $500) = $800 − $300 = $500。 |
| (c) 1 pt | 4 条:第 4 条的边际净收益为正($600 − $500 = $100),第 5 条为负($400 − $800 = −$400)。 |
| (d) 1 pt | 仍是 4 条:第 4 条 $900 > $500,第 5 条 $700 < $800。 |
| (e) 1 pt | 垄断竞争(monopolistic competition):企业很多,各自做广告而不考虑对手的反应(若考虑对手的反应就是寡头)。 |
| Boulevard | |||
| Delivery | No Delivery | ||
| Jackpot | 6:00 P.M. | $35, $30 | $55, $20 |
| 9:00 P.M. | $25, $50 | $45, $40 | |
Jackpot Florist and Boulevard Gardens share the market for floral bouquets in Tuliptown. Jackpot is deciding whether to close at 6:00 P.M. or to close at 9:00 P.M., and Boulevard is deciding whether to offer Delivery or No Delivery. The payoff matrix above shows the annual profits for each combination of actions that the firms can choose. The first entry shows Jackpot's profit, and the second entry shows Boulevard's profit. Assume that both firms know all the information in the matrix and act simultaneously and independently.
(a) Is Jackpot's dominant strategy to close at 6:00 P.M., to close at 9:00 P.M., or does it not have a dominant strategy?
(b) Suppose Jackpot chooses to close at 6:00 P.M. and Boulevard chooses No Delivery. Is this the profit-maximizing action by Boulevard? Explain using values from the payoff matrix.
(c) How much profit will Boulevard earn in the Nash equilibrium?
(d) Suppose these two firms merge to form one company with two locations and still face the same actions and payoffs. Which strategies would the new company choose to maximize its combined profit?
(e) Now assume that instead of merging, Jackpot proposes a plan to cooperate with Boulevard. Jackpot would agree to close at 9:00 P.M., and Boulevard would agree to No Delivery. If either firm breaks the agreement, it MUST subtract $12 from its profit that is then added to the other firm's profit.
(i) Assuming the agreement was in effect and enforced, redraw the matrix, including the players, actions, and payoffs.
(ii) Assuming Boulevard is a profit-maximizing firm and there are no antitrust concerns, would Boulevard agree to Jackpot's proposal? Explain using specific values from the redrawn payoff matrix.
| Point | 得分要求与解析 |
|---|---|
| (a) 1 pt | Jackpot 的优势策略是 6:00 P.M.(Boulevard 选 Delivery 时 35 > 25,选 No Delivery 时 55 > 45)。 |
| (b) 1 pt | 不是:Jackpot 6 点关门时,Boulevard 选 Delivery 赚 $30,选 No Delivery 只赚 $20。 |
| (c) 1 pt | $30。Boulevard 的优势策略是 Delivery(30 > 20,50 > 40),纳什均衡是 (6:00 P.M., Delivery) = ($35, $30)。 |
| (d) 1 pt | 9:00 P.M. 和 No Delivery:四格合计 65、75、75、85,最大是 $85。 |
| (e)(i) 1 pt | 正确重画矩阵(玩家、策略、收益都要写):违约的一方减 $12,另一方加 $12;双方都违约的格子不变。 |
| (e)(ii) 1 pt | 会同意:重画后 Jackpot 的优势策略变成 9 点(37 > 35,45 > 43),Boulevard 的优势策略变成 No Delivery(32 > 30,40 > 38),新均衡下 Boulevard 的利润从 $30 增加到 $40。 |
| Boulevard | |||
| Delivery | No Delivery | ||
| Jackpot | 6:00 P.M. | $35, $30 | $43, $32 |
| 9:00 P.M. | $37, $38 | $45, $40 | |
Tony's Trinkets and Bitaly's Bracelets are the only two firms in a town that produce and sell jewelry. Tony's Trinkets is deciding whether to produce Unique jewelry or Typical jewelry. Bitaly's Bracelets is deciding whether to produce Gold jewelry or Silver jewelry. The payoff matrix shows the payoffs for each combination of strategies. The first entry in each cell shows Tony's Trinkets' profit, and the second entry shows Bitaly's Bracelets' profit. Each firm independently and simultaneously chooses its strategy. Assume that the two firms know all the information in the matrix and do not cooperate.
| Bitaly’s Bracelets | |||
| Gold | Silver | ||
| Tony’s Trinkets | Unique | $15, $21 | $20, $19 |
| Typical | $10, $7 | $21, $16 | |
A. Suppose Bitaly's Bracelets chooses to produce Silver jewelry. Is choosing to produce Unique jewelry the best choice for Tony's Trinkets? Explain using numbers from the payoff matrix.
B. Is Bitaly's Bracelets' dominant strategy to produce Gold jewelry, to produce Silver jewelry, or does it not have a dominant strategy? Explain using numbers from the payoff matrix.
C. Identify all Nash equilibria for this game.
D. Suppose Tony's Trinkets' profit from producing Typical jewelry increases regardless of what Bitaly's Bracelets does. What is the minimum amount by which Tony's Trinkets' profit must increase in order for Typical jewelry to become a dominant strategy: $2, $4, $6, $11, or $15?
E. Suppose instead that these two firms now cooperate and merge into one firm to maximize their combined profits. The new firm will have two locations and continue to face the same actions and payoffs. Calculate the new firm's maximum combined profit. Show your work.
| Point | 得分要求与解析 |
|---|---|
| A 1 pt | No:Bitaly 选 Silver 时,Tony 选 Typical 赚 $21,比选 Unique 的 $20 多。 |
| B 1 pt | 没有优势策略:Tony 选 Unique 时 Gold 更好($21 > $19);Tony 选 Typical 时 Silver 更好($16 > $7)。 |
| C 1 pt | 两个纳什均衡:(Unique, Gold) 和 (Typical, Silver)。 |
| D 1 pt | $6。Typical 要在两种情况下都更好:对方选 Gold 时需要 10 + x > 15,即 x > 5;对方选 Silver 时 21 + x > 20 已经成立。选项中大于 $5 的最小值是 $6。 |
| E 1 pt | 四格合计 36、39、17、37 → 最大合计利润 = $20 + $19 = $39(要写出算式)。 |
| Bitaly’s Bracelets | |||
| Gold | Silver | ||
| Tony’s Trinkets | Unique | $15, $21 | $20, $19 |
| Typical | $10, $7 | $21, $16 | |
Noodle Lab is a ramen restaurant in a monopolistically competitive market. Noodle Lab is currently earning positive economic profit.
(a) Draw a correctly labeled graph for Noodle Lab showing its demand, marginal revenue, marginal cost, and average total cost curves, and show each of the following.
(i) The profit-maximizing quantity, labeled Q1
(ii) The profit-maximizing price, labeled P1
(iii) The area representing economic profit, shaded completely
(b) What will happen to the number of ramen restaurants in the long run? Explain how this affects the demand for Noodle Lab's ramen.
(c) Draw a new correctly labeled graph showing Noodle Lab in long-run equilibrium. Label the profit-maximizing quantity QL and the price PL.
(d) In long-run equilibrium, is Noodle Lab producing the allocatively efficient quantity? Explain.
(e) On your graph in part (c), show the quantity at which average total cost is minimized, labeled QA. Is Noodle Lab productively efficient in the long run? Explain.
(f) Noodle Lab starts an advertising campaign that convinces many customers that its ramen is unique. Will the demand for Noodle Lab's ramen become more elastic, become less elastic, or remain unchanged? Explain.
| Point | 评分要点与解析(原创题,按 AP 评分方式整理) |
|---|---|
| (a) 1 pt | 向下倾斜的需求 D,MR 在 D 下方(同一纵截距)。 |
| (a) 1 pt | 画出 MC,在 MR = MC 处标 Q1。 |
| (a) 1 pt | 从 Q1 往上到需求标 P1;ATC 在 Q1 处低于 P1,MC 穿过 ATC 最低点。 |
| (a) 1 pt | 完整涂出利润:P1 与 Q1 处的 ATC 之间、宽为 Q1 的矩形。 |
| (b) 1 pt | 拉面店数量增加(有经济利润、进入壁垒低);顾客被新店分走,Noodle Lab 的需求减少(左移)。 |
| (c) 1 pt | 需求与 ATC 相切,切点对应 QL 和 PL;MR = MC 也在 QL。 |
| (d) 1 pt | No:在 QL 处 PL > MC(价格 = 边际收益 > 边际成本),产量少于配置有效的数量。 |
| (e) 1 pt | QA 标在 ATC 最低点(MC 与 ATC 的交点),位于 QL 右边;No:QL < QA,没有在 ATC 最低处生产(产能过剩)。 |
| (f) 1 pt | Less elastic:顾客认为它独一无二,眼中的相近替代品变少,涨价时流失的顾客更少。 |
- 垄断竞争图和垄断图一样画:D、MR(在 D 下方)、MC、ATC(MC 穿过 ATC 最低点);长期图的需求必须与 ATC 相切,切点在 ATC 最低点左边。
- 收益矩阵题“Explain using numbers”:把比较的两个数都写出来,并说明是在对方的哪个选择下比较的。
- 重画矩阵:玩家名字、策略名、四格八个数全部写出,没变的数也要抄上。
- “minimum amount … to become a dominant strategy”:对方每种选择下各算一次需要的差额,取较大者,并严格大于它。
下一单元 Unit 5 进入要素市场:企业作为买方雇用劳动力,其中买方垄断(monopsony)是要素市场里的不完全竞争。
JL · AP Microeconomics · Unit 4(下)Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly · 题目标签:真题 历年 AP 考试原题(含 College Board 练习卷、国际卷),答案均对照官方答案键并重新验算(2024 年题目的答案为自行验算) · 原创 依照 AP 题型原创